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How to Combat Information Warfare in the Post-Truth Age 
 
A. Introduction 
The European Commission’s decision that the decision by the Lithuanian regulator to 
suspend, for three month, the retransmission of a Russian language channel ‘RTR Planeta’ 
containing incitement to hatred is compatible with EU Law falls within a time which can be 
described as the ‘Post-Truth Age’. In December 2016 the Society for the German Language 
selected ‘post-truth’ (German: postfaktisch) as its “Word of the Year 2016”.1 According to the 
website ‘Word of the Year’ is a word which has dominated the public discourse and is 
particularly suitable to express the political, economic and social atmosphere in Germany.   
This year’s decision reflects a profound change in political discourse: while since the 
Enlightment a rational and factual discussion has dominated political and social discourse, in 
recent times a shift towards a more intuitive approach becomes apparent in which emotions 
prevail over facts. Increasing parts of society, feeling betrayed by the ‘establishment’ and the 
political elite, are willing to ignore hard facts and believe obvious lies. Not necessarily the 
truth, but expressing the ‘perceived truth’ (‘gefühlte Wahrheit’) characterizes the ‘Post-Truth 
Age’.2 While this development is mainly associated with the presidential elections in the 
United States and the bewildering campaign of President Trump, twisting and turning facts, 
presenting alternative readings and interpretations of political and historical events has a 
long standing tradition in many countries especially the successor states of the former Soviet 
Union.3 
The fine network of one-sided interpretations of historical and political events, but also 
propaganda for war and incitement to hatred created by Russia throughout the last century 
has been described as ’Soft Pressure’4, ’Antidiplomacy’5 and ’Information Warfare’6.7 The 
idea behind these concepts lies in the observation that “since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Kremlin has lost direct political and military control of the region, but it started 
mastering the tools of non-military influence by exploiting the lingering weakness of post-
Soviet societies: growing internal political splits, social and economic discontent, ethnic 
                                                          
1
 Jochen A. Bär, Gesellschaft für Deutsche Sprache e.V., Pressemitteilung vom 09/12/2016, available 
at: http://gfds.de/wort-des-jahres-2016/ (last accessed on 20/03/2017); it was also selected as the 
Oxford Dictionaries Word of the Year 2016, see 
https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/press/news/2016/12/11/WOTY-16 (last accessed on 19/04/2017).  
2
 Jochen A. Bär, (fn. 1). 
3
 EU-Ambassadors, quoted by ZEIT Online, Die EU zieht in den Propagandakampf, 20 March 2015, 
available at: http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-03/russland-propaganda-eu-strategie-
informationskrieg (last accessed 30/03/2017). 
4
 Nerijus Maliukevičius, Tools of destabilization, Kremlin’s Media Offensive in Lithuania, Journal of 
Baltic Security, vol. 1, no. 1, 2015, p. 117. 
5
 Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik, Antidiplomacy in Russia’s Policies regarding Russian-Speakers in the 
Baltic States, Baltic Journal of Political Science, December 2016, no. 5, p. 89. 
6
 Mindaugas Kukyls and Raul Cârstocea, Instigations of Separatism in the Baltic States, June 2015, 
ECMI Issue Brief # 35, p. 3. 
7
 For a very good overview on Russia’s ‘Strategic communication’, see: European Union Institute for 
Security Studies (EUISS), Directorate-General for external politics, EU strategic communication with a 
view to counteract propaganda, 2016, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578008/ EXPO_IDA(2016)578008_EN.pdf 
(last accessed on 19/02/2017). 
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minorities, and prevailing energy and media dependencies.”8 This attempt falls onto fertile 
ground in post-Soviet countries such as Lithuania where “[t]he popularity of the Russian 
language, positive attitude towards Russian culture and symbols, widespread nostalgia for 
the Soviet past creates a very favourable environment for the Russian media and its 
propaganda narratives […].”9 This is especially true since Lithuania has a vibrant Russian 
speaking minority. Even though the smallest and best integrated minority in the Baltic States, 
the Russian-speaking population in Lithuania is continuously influenced by Russian Media, 
e.g. 15,7 per cent of the audience in Lithuania regularly watch Russian TV channels.10 
According to Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss the Kremlin takes advantage of this 
media dependency by deliberately weaponizing information, money and culture in order to 
conduct a new vision of ‘hybrid’ or ‘non-linear’ war. 11 “This hybrid type of war, a specific 21st 
century phenomenon relying extensively on the strategic use of information and its 
dissemination […] presents a challenge to the security of all countries in Europe”12, 
particularly the Baltic States.13   
The decision of the Lithuanian Radio and Television Commission (RTCL) to ban the 
rebroadcasting of a Russian TV channel on Lithuanian territory for three month, whose 
compatibility with EU Law the European Commission (EC) had to decide on, can be 
interpreted as a counteraction to Russian ‘Information Warfare’.  
In the following I will take a closer look at these two decisions based on a summary of the 
EC’s decision. This will be followed by a short discussion of the term ‘Information Warfare’ 
with a view to distinguish the concept of ‘propaganda for war and incitement to hatred’ (which 
in most countries is illegal) from that of mere ‘one-sided interpretations of historical and 
political events’. In a third part the compatibility of the RTCL’s decision with EU Law will be 
analysed. Lastly, a comprehensive overview of three legally feasible and politically 
favourable measures against ‘Information Warfare’ (by the example of the concerned 
programme of RTR Planeta) on the national (with a focus on Lithuania), EU and international 
level will be given. 
B. European Commission Decision – Summary 
The EC adopted its decision on 17 February 201714 pursuant to Article 3 (2) subpara. 2 of the 
Audio-visual Media Directive (Directive 2010/13/EU; short: AVMD)15 upon notification of the 
                                                          
8
 Nerijus Maliukevičius, (fn. 4), p. 117. 
9
 Ibid, p. 120; for a similar opinion see: Clay Moore, Western Promises – Sustainability and 
Consequences for Baltic Security, Fall 2015, p. 17 (18). 
10
 Nerijus Maliukevičius, (fn. 4), p. 122. 
11
 Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes 
Information, Culture and Money, Institute of Modern Russia (New York), 2014, p. 29, available at: 
http://www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/PW-31.pdf (last accessed on 
24/03/2017). 
12
 Mindaugas Kukyls and Raul Cârstocea, (fn. 6), p. 3.  
13
 Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik, (fn. 5), p. 96.  
14
 European Commission, Decision of 17.2.2017 on the compatibility of the measures adopted by 
Lithuania pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audio-visual media services, 
Brussels 17/02/2017, C(2017) 814 final. 
15
 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the 
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), 
15 April 2010, OJ L 95,  p. 1. 
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Lithuanian government on 2 December 2016 of its decision to temporarily suspend the 
retransmission, including on the internet, of the television broadcast RTR Planeta in the 
territory of Lithuania for a period of three month.16 Art. 3 AVMD provides that Member States 
may only restrict retransmissions on their territory of audiovisual media services on 
enumerated grounds, among those manifest, serious and grave infringements of Art. 6 
AVMD which outlaws any incitement to hatred based on race, sex, religion or nationality. Art. 
3 (2) subpara. 2 AVMD lays down that it shall, within two months following notification of the 
measures taken by the Member State, take a decision on whether the measures are 
compatible with Union law. 
RTR Planeta is broadcasted by the Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting 
Company (VGTRK), but falls under the Swedish jurisdiction as it is registered as Rossia RTR 
by the Swedish broadcasting authorities and is broadcasted from Sweden.17  
Lithuania claimed that RTR Planeta’s broadcasting fell within the purview of Art. 3 para. 1 lit. 
a AVMD by repeatedly propagating the instigation of war and incitement to hatred and calling 
for the physical destruction of, among others, Turkey, Ukraine, the United States and the 
Baltic States. According to the Lithuanian authorities the statements made on the television 
programme were aimed at creating tensions and reactions of animosity or rejection from the 
Russian minority in Lithuania towards the Lithuania-speaking minortiy.18  
The Commission found that the Lithuanian authorities had respected the procedural 
requirements laid down in Art. 3 (2) AVMD, including the broadcaster’s right to be heard and 
their notification obligations towards the Swedish Government and the European Union.19  
In order to determine whether the alleged statements amounted to ‘incitement to hatred’ the 
EC referred to the Roj TV Case20 in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had 
interpreted the word ‘incitation’ as an action intended to direct specific behaviour and ‘hatred’ 
as a feeling of animosity or rejection with regard to a group of persons.  
Based on the abovementioned definitions the EC decided that the information provided by 
the Lithuanian government concerning the statements made by RTR Planeta was sufficient 
to consider the alleged statements as incitement to hatred.21 Furthermore it held that, taking 
into account the history of Lithuania as  an ex-Soviet State, the potential tensions created by 
statements of RTR Planeta between the Russian-speaking minority and the Lithuanian-
speaking majority and the fact that these statements were partly related to an ongoing 
military confrontation involving Russia and contained unambiguous threats of occupation and 
destruction of other states, including the Baltic States, the infringement was manifest, serious 
and grave.22 Finally the measures taken by Lithuania were neither considered discriminatory 
nor disproportionate to the objective of ensuring that media service providers comply with the 
rules of Art. 6 AVMD.23  
                                                          
16
 Commission Decision of 17.2.2017, (fn. 14), para. 7. 
17
 Commission Decision of 17.2.2017, (fn. 14), para. 9. 
18
 Commission Decision of 17.2.2017, (fn. 14), para. 17. 
19
 Commission Decision of 17.2.2017, (fn. 14), para. 15. 
20
 ECJ, Judgement of the Court of 22  September 2011, Mesopotamia Broadcast and Roj TV, Joined 
Cases C-244/10 and C-245/10.  
21
 Commission Decision of 17.2.2017, (fn. 14), para. 18. 
22
 Commission Decision of 17.2.2017, (fn. 14), para. 19. 
23
 Commission Decision of 17.2.2017, (fn. 14), para. 20. 
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The Commission rejected the defence of the broadcaster that views expressed by guests of 
talk shows were outside the broadcaster’s editorial responsibility (referring to the definition of 
editorial responsibility in Art. 1 (1) lit. a AVMD) and a restriction of such opinions would lead 
to censorship.24 Furthermore the Commission dismissed the argument that difficulties to 
define ‘incitement to hatred’ and the absence of a definition of the concept of ‘propaganda’ in 
national and international law made it unlawful to impose sanctions on the broadcaster 
because of a violation of these (unclear) concepts.25 Also, the Commission did not find a 
violation of the broadcaster’s fundamental right to freedom of expression enshrined in Art. 11 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). Pursuant to Art. 52 (1) CFR the rights and freedoms 
recognised in the CFR could be subject to limitation provided for by law. By enacting the 
AVMD the legislator had chosen to limit the freedom of expression of audio-visual media 
services for the protection of minors (Art. 27 AVMD) and the prevention of incitement to 
hatred based on race, sex, religion and nationality (Art. 6 AVMD).26  
The Commission therefore concluded that the measures notified by Lithuania on 2 December 
2016 were compatible with Union Law.        
C. The Meaning of Information Warfare – Distinguishing between Propaganda and 
One-sided Interpretations  
It is the fate of a counteraction that its legality depends on the character of the action 
preceding it. In order to determine the legality of the RTCL’s decision, it is therefore 
necessary to take a closer look at the actions of RTR Planeta and determine their character. 
Andrei G. Richter notes in this regard that “the courts suffer distinguishing between illegal 
‘propaganda for war and incitement to hatred’ and propaganda of ‘one-sided interpretation’ of 
the conflicts. All these terms are somewhat raw, controversial, and infrequently parsed in the 
legal process.”27 A similar distinction is drawn by the OSCE Office of the Representative on 
Freedom of the Media. It suggests distinguishing – at law and policy level – between two 
sorts of propaganda in the media. “The first is propaganda for war, as well as national, racial 
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, as 
defined in international and national law. It is illegal and therefore demands judicial action 
with the appropriate measures in line with international human rights law standards. The 
second type of propaganda combines all the rest. It may be an inappropriate and scornful 
activity; it damages the profession of journalism, but does not necessarily call for legal 
action.”28 This second type of propaganda is what Richter describes as “one-sided 
interpretation”.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Commission Decision of 17.2.2017, (fn. 14), para. 21, 23. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Commission Decision of 17.2.2017, (fn. 14), para. 22. 
27
 Andrei G. Richter, Legal Responses to Propaganda Broadcasts Related to Crisis in and Around 
Ukraine, International Journal of Communication, 2015, vol. 9, p. 3125 (3140). 
28
 Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Non-Paper, Propaganda and 
Freedom of the Media, Vienna 2015, p. 32, available at: 
http://www.osce.org/fom/203926?download=true (last accessed on 31/03/2017). 
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I. Propaganda 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary ‘propaganda’ is “the systematic dissemination of 
information, especially in a biased or misleading way, in order to promote a political cause or 
point of view”29.  
Regarding methods typically used for ‘propaganda’ and distinguishing it from other forms of 
rhetoric, Nowak has pointed out that it constitutes “intentional, well-aimed influencing of 
individuals by employing various channels of communication to disseminate, above all, 
incorrect or exaggerated allegations of fact. Also included thereunder are negative or 
simplistic value judgements whose intensity is at least comparable to that of provocation, 
instigation, or incitement.”30   
II. Propaganda for war 
‘Propaganda for war’ has been defined by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in General 
Comment 11 as encompassing “all forms of propaganda threatening or resulting in an act of 
aggression or breach of the peace contrary to the Charter of the United Nations”31. The HRC 
however makes a significant exclusion from the scope of the crime, by emphasising that Art. 
20 (1) does “not prohibit advocacy of the sovereign right to self-defence or the right of 
peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.”32  
Moreover the UN General Assembly has delivered a rather clear definition of ‘war 
propaganda’ condemning “all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which 
is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression”33.  
III. Incitement to Hatred 
Defining ‘incitement to hatred’ (also called: ‘hate speech’) appears much more problematic. It 
has been noted by the Press Unit of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that 
“there is no universally accepted definition of the expression ‘hate speech’”34.  
                                                          
29
 Oxford English Dictionary, 2017, Oxford University Press, ‘propaganda‘, n., available at: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/152605?rskey=hyddW4&result=1&isAdvanced=false (last accessed on 
03/04/3017).  
30
 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – CCPR Commentary, 2. ed., 2005, p. 
472.  
31
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 11: Prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting 
national, racial or religious hatred (Art. 20), 29/07/1983. CCPR General Comment No. 11 (General 
Comments), available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/CCPRGeneralComment 
No11.pdf (last accessed on 31/03/2017).  
32
 Ibid.  
33
 General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 110 (II), Measures to be taken 
against propaganda and the inciters of a new war, 108th plenary meeting, 3 November 1947, 
A/RES/2/110, available at: http://www.un-documents.net/a2r110.htm (last accessed on 31/03/02017). 
  
34
 Press Unit of the European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet on ‘Hate Speech‘, July 2013, 
available at: 
http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/Portal/1292427369687?blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobh
eadername1=Content-
Disposition&blobheadername2=Grupo&blobheadervalue1=attachment%3B+filename%3D 
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However an attempt to define ‘hate speech’ has been made by the Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Ministers in their Recommendation No. R (97) 20 defining ‘hate speech’ as “all 
forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-
Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by 
aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, 
migrants and people of immigrant origin.”35 
As the OSCE Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media has noted this formula is 
circular, as it defines ‘hatred’ through ‘hate’ and ‘hate’ through ‘hatred’.36  
A more handy definition has been delivered by the ‘Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence’ released by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) in 2012,37 which refers to the Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and 
Equality (Camden Principles). The Camden Principles define ‘hatred’ and ‘hostility’ as 
“intense and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards the target 
group”38. 
The most precise definition has probably been given by the ECJ in its Roj TV judgement of 
22 September 2011, explaining the meaning of the words ‘incitement’ and ‘hatred’ as “the 
first one refer[ing] to an action intended to direct specific behaviour, and the second refer[ing] 
to a feeling of animosity or rejection with regard to a group of persons”39.  
A clear distinction between ‘propaganda to war’ and ‘incitement to hatred’ is not always 
possible, as “propaganda for war is, in fact, a form of incitement to violence based on 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred.”40 In academic and court decisions both 
concepts are used alternatively. 
IV. Application to the Decision by the Lithuanian Radio and Television 
Commission of 16 November 2016 
In the case at hand the Lithuanian authorities found ‘propaganda for war’ and cases of 
“incitement to war, ethnic based hatred, stigmatising, calling to violence and physical action 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Hate_speech__julio_de_2013.PDF&blobheadervalue2=Docs_Libertad+religiosa_interes (last 
accessed on: 31/03/0217).  
35
 Council of European Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on "Hate Speech", (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 October 
1997 
at the 607th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies), available at: 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearch 
Services/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680505d5b (last accessed on 21/03/2017). 
36
 Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, (fn. 28), p. 34.  
37
 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Rabat Plan of Action on the 
prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence - Conclusions and recommendations emanating from the four 
regional expert workshops organised by OHCHR, in 2011, and adopted by experts in Rabat, Morocco 
on 5 October 2012, para. 19, available at: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/ 
Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf (last accessed on 31/03/2017). 
38
 The Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality, Article 19, Global Campaign for 
Free 
Expression, London April 2009, Principle 12 - Incitement to Hatred, available at: 
https://www.article19.org/data /files/pdfs/standards/the-camden-principles-on-freedom-of-expression-
and-equality.pdf (last accessed on 31/03/2017). 
39
 Roj TV Case, (fn. 20), para. 41. 
40
 Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, (fn. 28), p. 14. 
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against certain countries such as the USA, Romania, The Czech Republic, Poland and the 
Baltic States”.41  
The Commission analysed several statements made during the programme ‘The Duel – A 
programme by Vladimir Solovyov’ finding that it contained a systematic dissemination of 
biased and misleading information amounting to a threat to peace and promoting an act of 
aggression. In this regard the RTCL stated that the intention of the broadcaster was “to 
intimidate and convince the intended audience that the USA is the axis of evil that needs to 
be fought against with a gun”42. They cite a participant of the show stating: “Our reply to 
make those planning an attack on our country calm down. Such plans exist, they are 
[provided] in writing and they contain signatures and stamps, and they have been voiced out 
by all the US presidents. I personally am not the president of our country but I am telling you, 
[…] there will be nothing left of Romania either. And also in the Czech Republic, if there is 
(.......) and also in Poland and the Baltic States, if the American tanks come close to our 
border, they will not retreat, they will not move back. They will burn together with the entire 
crew.“ (V. Zhirinovsky). […] „You are everywhere, everywhere, your disgusting traces are 
everywhere, you provocateurs. You have incited all the wars and you are now getting ready 
for your usual military ventures but I am warning you Michael Bohm, we have enough bomb 
shelters for everyone – 100 %, and you have none, you should think about your citizens...“ 
(V. Zhirinovsky).43  
Throughout the programme the USA are being portrayed as aggressors, linking US military 
actions to terrorist attacks. A guest of the show claimed that the USA have already occupied 
150 countries and that they were seeking war, not Russia: “That‘s what they have been 
saying since May 1945. Our soldiers do not go close to the American border, they move 
towards us. Are you saying you want to have June 22? I am just saying. All Americans think 
that they will start first and then the bombs will drop on our heads again? This is not 
happening again. It will all become clear on June 20. There will be no more June 22 for you 
Americans, and also for you in Romania (pointing to the journalist).“ (V Zhirinovsky).44  
These statements perfectly show that an aggression by Russia against the ‘West’ especially 
the US and its Eastern European allies is being justified by claiming an act of self-defence 
against Western aggression, which has not taken place. Such an aggression by Russia 
would thus violate its obligations under the UN-Charter and could not be justified by the right 
to self-defence. Such threats therefore clearly constitute propaganda to war.  
Furthermore the RTCL found several statements delivered in a special (aggressive) 
language made during the show creating a feeling of animosity or rejection with regard to a 
group of persons (e.g. Americans and its Eastern European Allies) and calling for violent 
actions against those. According to the RTCL the show “projects obvious and univocal 
incitement to violence against the USA, Romania, the Czech Republic, Poland and the Baltic 
States.”45 This can be seen from a statement made during the programme reading “On June 
                                                          
41
 The Radio and Television Commission of Lithuania (RTCL), Resolution regarding suspension of free 
reception of RTR Planeta TV Services, 16 November 2016, No KS-200, Vilnius, p. 3, available in 
Lithuanian at: http://www.rtk.lt/content/uploads/2016/11/ks-200-2016.pdf (last accessed on 
24/04/2017; an English copy lies with the author).  
42
 Ibid, p. 4. 
43
 Ibid; The reference to June 22 probably refers to the act of aggression by Nazi Germany against the 
Soviet Union which began on 22 June 1941.  
44
 Ibid.  
45
 Ibid, p. 4.  
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20 everything will be destroyed – everything. And you will announce to the people of 
Bucharest from a bunker about the Russian flag descending over Bucharest“, „In the Baltic 
States, if the American tanks come close to our borders they will not retreat, they will not 
move back. They will burn together with the entire crew“46.  
The intention of such a comment is clearly to incite hatred between Russians and American, 
Romanians and Lithuanians (in this case).  
It can thus be concluded that the RTCL rightfully declared the statements made during the 
RTR Planeta Programmes to constitute ‘propaganda to war and incitement to hatred’.  
D. Possibilities to Counteract Information Warfare 
The possibilities to counteract information warfare differ depending on the character of the 
action. One-sided interpretations of historical and political events (as defined above) are 
generally protected by the fundamental right of freedom of the press/media: e.g. Art. 19 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Art. 19 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 11 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 47, Art. 25 
Lithuanian Constitution. Based on Art. 17 ECHR an exception is being made for repeated 
denial of the Holocaust.48  The proportionality of a restriction of the freedom of opinion differs 
from case to case and must be determined individually. The case at hand however was 
correctly classified as ‘propaganda to war’ and ‘incitement to hatred’, which is why this 
analysis will be focusing on the legal possibilities to counteract ‘propaganda to war’ and 
‘incitement to hatred’. In the following I will thus take a closer look on the legal 
countermeasures against ‘propaganda for war and incitement to hatred’ through audio-visual 
Media and their political implications.  
I. Legal Implications 
1. National Law – Lithuania 
The national foundation for the prohibition of propaganda for war and hatred lies in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (Lithuanian Constitution). Art. 135 of the Lithuanian 
Constitution establishes that “in the Republic of Lithuania war propaganda shall be 
prohibited”49. Furthermore according to Art. 25 Lithuanian Constitution the “freedom to 
express convictions and to impart information shall not extend to criminal actions—incitement 
of national, racial, religious, or social hatred, violence and discrimination, with slander and 
disinformation.”50  
More concrete prohibitions can be found in Lithuanian statutory law. Even though 
propaganda for war does not constitute a criminal offence under the Lithuanian Criminal 
Code, Art. 170 punishes public incitement to violence on the grounds of “sex, sexual 
                                                          
46
 Ibid.  
47
 Hans D. Jarass (ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der EU - Kommentar, 3. Aufl. 2016, Art. 11, Rn. 11.  
48
 For Art. 11 ECHR see, Hans D. Jarass, in: Jarass (ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der EU - 
Kommentar, 3. Aufl. 2016, Art. 11, Rn. 11. 
49
 Art. 135 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, adopted on 25 October 1992, available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/fr/text.jsp?file_id= 188281#LinkTarget_261 (last accessed on 27/03/2017). 
50
 Art. 25 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, adopted on 25 October 1992, available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/fr/text.jsp?file_id=188281#LinkTarget_856 (last accessed on 27/03/2017). 
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orientation, race, nationality, language, descent, social status, religion, convictions or views 
or finances”51.  
Relevant for the prohibition of propaganda in audio-visual media is however Art. 19 of the 
Law on the Provision of Information (LPI)52. The LPI echoes the constitution by prohibiting 
the media from disseminating information that “spreads propaganda, instigates war or 
hatred, ridicule, humiliation, instigates discrimination, violence, physical violent treatment of a 
group or a person belonging thereto on grounds of age, sex, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, 
race, nationality, citizenship, language, origin, social status, belief, convictions, views or 
religion” (Art. 19 (1) subpara. 3 LPI). In addition Art. 19 (2) LPI prohibits “to disseminate 
disinformation and information which is slanderous and offensive to a person or which 
degrades his honour and dignity”.  
Art. 34 (11) LPI provides that “free reception in the Republic of Lithuania of television 
programmes […] from countries other than the EU Member States […] may be suspended 
upon a decision of the [Lithuanian Radio and Television] Commission if such television 
programmes […] of those countries violate the requirements of Articles 17 or 19 of this Law”.  
A decision by the RTCL to suspend television programmes needs approval by an 
administrative court.53 
Based on these provisions the RTCL obtained such an approval for a three month 
suspension of rebroadcasting of the programme Weekly News by RTR Planeta on 7 April 
2014.54 The RTCL argued that “this weekly review included non-objective and tendentious 
information that justified violence against residents, military intervention in a sovereign state 
(Ukraine), and the annexation of a part of it, thus encouraging military activities and 
fomenting hatred between Russians and Ukrainians”55. 
In yet another decision the RTCL suspended for three month rebroadcasts of the programme 
The Territory of Misinterpretation by REN TV Baltic, another Russian TV Channel 
rebroadcasted from the UK.56 The RTCL argued that the broadcaster “disseminated biased 
and tendentious information about events in Ukraine and war-mongering and hate 
propaganda against Ukrainians and the legitimate Ukrainian government, as well as against 
EU and NATO countries that support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine”57. 
In both cases the courts found a violation of Art. 19 (1) subpara. 2 LPI and therefore 
regarded the decision to suspend the programmes compatible with Art. 34 (11) LPI.  
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2. European Union Law 
The foundation for the justification of prohibiting propaganda for war and hatred in EU Law 
lies within the CFR. Art. 11 (1) CFR provides that everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 
According to Art. 11 (2) CFR the freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected. 
Art. 52 (1) CFR however stipulates that the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised 
by this Charter can be limited. Such limitations must be provided for by law and respect the 
essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations 
may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.  
Yet it could be argued that not only a justification of prohibiting such propaganda can be 
found within the European fundamental rights regime, but that European fundamental rights 
oblige the EU and its Member States to effectively prevent it. As has been noticed,58 
European fundamental rights can evoke the protective duty of the EU and especially its 
Member States. The Schmidberger and Omega decisions of the ECJ59 can be understood in 
that way.60 However, Art. 51 (2) CFR makes it very clear that a protective duty may not 
establish any new power for the Union, but has to be fulfilled on the basis of an already 
existing power.  
Art. 11 CFR does not explicitly oblige its addressees to prohibit propaganda and therefore 
does not alone establish a protective duty. Yet Art. 6 (3) TEU states that besides the 
fundamental rights recognised by the CFR, fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union's law. The reference to the ECHR could be taken 
as a pars pro toto for the entirety of the human rights treaty obligations of all Member States. 
In its Nold case the ECJ stated that similarly to drawing inspiration from the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States, “international treaties for the protection of human rights on 
which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply 
guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law”.61 Even though 
the wording of Art. 6 (3) TEU appears narrower than these earlier judgments of the ECJ, 
referring only to the ECHR, the provision should be read as an affirmation of this 
jurisprudence rather than a restriction.62 In the ECHR there is no explicit provision outlawing 
propaganda for war and hatred.63  However, all EU Member States have ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR64) and its Art. 20 ICCPR, 
prohibiting any propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
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constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, triggers the protective duty of 
governments.65 An explicit obligation to outlaw propaganda for war and incitement to hatred 
can also be found in Art. 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination66 (CERD), which has been ratified by all EU Member States67 as well. 
Even though ratified by fewer EU Member States,68 similar provisions are included in the 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts 
of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems69 (Additional 
Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention).70 This shows that there is a common recognition by 
EU Member States of a protective duty to prevent propaganda for war and incitement to 
hatred on the level of international human rights law. If one takes into consideration that the 
EU professes to contribute to the protection of human rights as well as to the strict 
observance and the development of international law (Art. 3 (5) TEU), there are thus good 
arguments to recognise a protective duty of the state within the EU fundamental rights 
regime and consequently assume an obligation of the EU and its Member States to 
effectively prevent propaganda for war and incitement to hatred as a matter also of EU law. 
This reading of Art. 6 (3) TEU in connection with Art. 3 (5) TEU however enlarges the circle 
of positive obligations guaranteed by the fundamental rights recognised as general principles 
of the Union’s law extensively and could lead to conflicts of competences between the ECJ 
on the one side and other treaty governing bodies such as the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) or the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) on the other. 
Conflicts could especially arise concerning the competence to interpret the concerned 
treaties and to demand compliance with treaty obligations. Seeming to have similar concerns 
the ECJ so far has mainly referred to international human rights treaties to merely support its 
findings under EU law.71  
It is thus far fetched to establish a strict protective duty under EU law obliging Member States 
to prohibit propaganda for war and incitement to hatred. In extreme cases it is however likely 
that taking into consideration international human rights obligations conceded by all Member 
States the ECJ would limit the Member States discretion to only one possible lawful decision: 
the prohibition of such propaganda.  
The specific legal basis to counteract propaganda however is provided for by the Audio-
visual Media Service Directive (AVMSD). The Commission has started to update the AVMSD 
as part of its “Digital Single Market strategy”.72 The latter was adopted by the EC on the 6 
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May 2015.73 It aims at creating the right environment and conditions for digital networks and 
services to flourish by providing high-speed, secure and trustworthy infrastructures and 
services supported by the right regulatory conditions.”74 As part of its “Digital Single Market 
strategy”, the EU has implemented rules applying to audio-visual media services such as 
traditional broadcasters, video-on-demand providers and online (video sharing) platforms.  
Art. 3 (1) AVMSD echoes the CFR by stipulating that Member States shall ensure the 
freedom of reception and shall not restrict retransmission on their territory of audio-visual 
media services from other Member States for reasons which fall within the fields coordinated 
by the Directive.  
Art. 3 (2) AVMSD provides for an exception to this rule where a television broadcast from 
another Member State manifestly, seriously and gravely infringes Art. 27 (1) or (2) AVMSD 
relating to the protection of minors and/or Art. 6 AVMSD on incitement to hatred based on 
race, sex, religion or nationality and lays out the conditions which need to be fulfilled to make 
use of such an exception (i.e. impose a limitation). Art. 3 (4) AVMSD stipulates a similar 
exception for on-demand audio-visual media services.  
Art. 6 AVMSD requires Member States to ensure that audio-visual media services provided 
by media service providers under their jurisdiction do not contain any incitement to hatred 
based on race, sex, religion or nationality. 
According to Art. 3 (2) subpara. 2 AVMSD the [European] Commission shall within two 
months following the notification of the measures taken by the Member States, take a 
decision on whether they are compatible with EU Law.  
The Commission adopted such a decision on 10 July 2015 for the first time. In it the EC 
concluded that the three month suspension of the retransmission of the Russian-language 
channel RTR Planeta by the Lithuanian authorities, in view of several infringements of Art. 6 
AVMSD, was in accordance with EU Law.  
The decision at issue seamlessly continues this practice.  Instead of invoking national law (as 
they did before – see above) the Lithuanian authorities referred to EU Law in order to justify 
the suspension of the rebroadcasting of RTR Planeta. This approach raises three legal 
issues: the assessment whether there actually was a case of propaganda for war or 
incitement to hatred, the lawfulness of the limitation of the freedom of expression and the 
question of editorial control.  
In the case at hand the Commission undisputedly and clearly found a case of propaganda for 
war and an incitement to hatred (as defined in the Roj TV Case by the ECJ – see above), 
laying down at length that the infringement actually was manifest, serious and grave.75   
Furthermore they correctly decided that even though the suspension of rebroadcasting RTR 
Planeta encroached upon the broadcaster’s right to freedom of expression, such a limitation 
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was justified according to Art. 52 (1) CFR, as it was provided for by law through Art. 3 (1) 
AVMSD and respected the essence of this right as well as the principle of proportionality.76  
The only question which actually seems problematic is that of editorial control. The 
Commission rejected the defence of the broadcaster that views expressed by guests of talk 
shows were outside the broadcaster’s editorial responsibility duly referring to the definition of 
editorial responsibility in Art. 1 (1) lit. a AVMD.77 In the case of television broadcasts ‘editorial 
responsibility’ means the exercise of effective control both over the selection of the 
programmes and over their organisation in a chronological schedule. However, neither the 
EC nor the RTCL elaborated on the question arising from the situation of the broadcaster 
being formally licensed in an EU country, but the programme being actually produced in the 
Russian Federation. In an earlier decision the RTCL’ position, affirmed by the Vilnius 
Regional Court, was that “though the broadcaster was formally licensed in an EU country 
(Ren TV Baltic in the UK), its programmes were produced in the Russian Federation and the 
EU Company had no editorial control or influence over their content. Thus restrictions were 
supposedly directed against broadcasters that do not fall under the protection of the 
procedures provided in Article 3 (2) of the AVMSD.”78 By holding the Swedish RTR Planeta 
broadcaster responsible for the infringements of Art. 3 (2) AVMSD at hand the Lithuanian 
authorities have clearly abandoned this position turning towards a much broader approach of 
editorial responsibility, which has been indirectly affirmed by the Commission. This ‘change 
in direction’ can be interpreted as a the expression of a general attitude of EU institutions 
(including the ECJ) and the ECtHR to hold audio-visual media services, especially internet 
service providers, such as video-sharing platforms, responsible for comments, opinions and 
statements expressed on their platform/in their programmes.79 This attitude can, in my 
opinion, be explained by the increasing challenges of creating a legal framework concerning 
the internet, the impossibility to apply the conventional territorial principle of jurisdiction to 
matters concerning the Internet and the possibilities of Internet service providers to 
circumvent responsibility by using loopholes appearing as a result of these challenges.  
Overall the decision of the Commission appears to be a good example of the application of 
EU Law counteracting propaganda, as the Commission rightfully holds the suspension of 
RTR Planeta to be in line with EU Law. Notwhithstanding this, it would have been desirable 
for the Commission to elaborate upon the question of editorial responsibility despite the fact 
that this defence has not been brought forward by the broadcaster.  
3. International Law 
Several provisions in international law deal with the freedom of expression and the media. 
The most relevant provisions in this regard for the European countries are Art. 10 ECHR, Art. 
19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 4 CERD 
and the provisions of the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention. 
Art. 10 ECHR protects the freedom of expression. According to the ECtHR this includes all 
"‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter 
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of indifference, but also […] those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population."80 (Handyside Formula).   
There is however no explicit provision in the ECHR outlawing propaganda.  
Certainly the freedom of expression is not guaranteed to an unlimited extent. The Court 
noted in Erbakan v Turkey that “… [T]olerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human 
beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society. That being so, as a 
matter of principle it may be considered necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction 
or even prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based 
on intolerance […], provided that any ‘formalities’, ‘conditions’, ‘restrictions’ or ‘penalties’ 
imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”81 The ECtHR has found in several 
cases that restrictions can be put on the protection afforded by Art. 10 ECHR in cases of 
propaganda for war and incitement to hatred. In cases of propaganda for ethnic82, racial83 
and religious84 hate the ECtHR found that the remarks were directed against the 
Convention’s underlying values and would therefore be removed from the protection of 
Article 10 ECHR by Article 17 ECHR (“prohibition of abuse of rights”).  
In cases of “incitement to ethnic hatred”85, “incitement to racial discrimination or hatred”86 and 
“incitement to religious intolerance”87 the ECtHR found that even though those remarks 
generally fell under the protection of Art. 10 ECHR, supressing such statements would be 
lawful if prescribed by law, pursuing one or more legitimate aims, and, if it is necessary in a 
democratic society to achieve these aims. 
The Lithuanian authorities/courts themselves so far have not referred to the ECHR when 
suspending audio-visual media programmes due to propaganda for war and incitement to 
hatred. In a similar case however, the Latvian Regulator NEPLP (National Electronic Mass 
Media Council of Latvia) dedicated a significant amount of its argumentation to prove that its 
decision to suspend the rebroadcasting of the Russian Programme Rossiya RTR was made 
in accordance with Art. 10 and 17 ECHR.88  
In particular the NEPLP admitted that suspending the rebroadcasts of Rossiya RTR infringed 
the right to freedom of expression of the TV Channel. However they found that in this case 
“the public benefit of ‘not being subject to propaganda” outweighed the encroachment of the 
broadcaster’s right. The public interest involved protecting the audience from non-objective 
and tendentious news and other broadcasts that called for war or a military conflict and 
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incited hatred for reasons of ethnicity or nationality.”89 In order to support their arguments the 
NEPLP cited judgements of the ECtHR that, in the absence of hate speech provisions, had 
referred to “the issues of pluralism in public broadcasting, the need for journalists to observe 
professional ethics, and the general design of the ECHR to maintain and promote the 
democratic ideals and values”90. 
Art. 19 ICCPR guarantees the right to hold opinions (Art. 19 (1) ICCPR) and the right to 
freedom of expression (Art. 19 (2) ICCPR). However according to Art. 19 (3) ICCPR these 
rights carry with it special duties and responsibilities. They may therefore be subject to 
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary 
for respect of the rights or reputations of others, for the protection of national security or of 
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. 
Art. 20 ICCPR prohibits any propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.  
There seems to be consent that the prohibition of propaganda for war and hate speech under 
Art. 20 ICCPR does not only trigger the responsibility of the mass media and other private 
enterprises but also the protective duty of governments. Any other reading would allow 
governments to shirk off their responsibility. “[W]hile powerful media corporations are indeed 
able to use their own initiative and means to disseminate such propaganda […] it is unlikely 
to be launched without at least implicit support of a third state.”91 There is however great 
debate about the question how broad the term ‘prohibition of war propaganda’ should be 
interpreted and whether it is to be limited to direct ‘incitement to war’ or whether it additionally 
encompasses “propaganda which serves either as a means of preparation for a future war or 
to preclude peaceful settlement of disputes”92. 
However none of the courts or national authorities have made references to Art. 19 or 20 
ICCPR so far when suspending rebroadcasting of TV Channels. Andrei G. Richter suggests 
that this is caused by inconclusive interpretations of the UN Human Rights Committee and 
the preference of the national authorities and courts to invoke Art. 10 ECHR which is a far 
more familiar instrument steadily interpreted by the ECtHR.93  
Art. 4 CERD states that all parties to the Convention “condemn all propaganda and all 
organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of 
persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and 
discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures 
designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination … with due regard to 
the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights 
expressly set forth in Art. 5 of this Convention. In this regard the states are obliged to declare 
an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, 
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts 
against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin (Art. 4 (a) CERD). 
They shall furthermore declare illegal and prohibit organizations and all other propaganda 
activities, which promote such discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such 
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organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law (Art. 4 (b) CERD). Finally the 
state parties are required not to permit public authorities or public institutions, national or 
local, to promote or incite racial discrimination (Art. 4 (c) CERD).The Additional Protocol to 
the Cybercrime Convention aims at providing an adequate legal response to propaganda of 
a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. It obliges its parties to 
adopt legislation (and if necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law) 
prohibiting the dissemination of racist and xenophobic material through computer systems 
(Art. 3), racist and xenophobic motivated threats (Art. 4), racist and xenophobic motivated 
insults (Art. 5) and the distribution of denying, grossly minimising, approving or justifying 
genocide or crimes against humanity.  
Both treaties establish an explicit obligation of the states to prohibit propaganda and can 
therefore be read as proof of a protective duty of the state parties.  
Even though Lithuania ratified the CERD in 199894 and the Additional Protocol to the 
Cybercrime Convention in 200695 neither one of them is mentioned in the RTCL’s decision. 
The Lithuanian authorities do not elaborate on a potential protective duty deriving from their 
obligations under international law, not ‘binding themselves’ by explicitly admitting to such an 
obligation and thus leaving the backdoor open.  
II. Political Aspects 
The former United States Ambassador to Lithuania Deborah A. McCarthy said “[a] preferred 
strategy of the RTCL has been to dole out temporary broadcasting bans of three months to 
channels that in its view incited violence or aired blatant disinformation. In the long term, 
content restrictions are not an effective means of combating disinformation. In fact, they run 
the risk of feeding the existing Russian narrative that Lithuania wants to keep the truth out.”96 
There lies a lot of truth at the heart of this statement, as “only a well-functioning open, 
diverse and dynamic media environment can effectively neutralize the effect of 
propaganda”.97 
In addition to the above described legal instruments to counteract propaganda to war and 
incitement to hatred by banning them, it thus appears of great interest to take a look at 
politically preferable strategies to combat propaganda.  
Strategies to combat propaganda will have to tackle the problem of propaganda at many 
different levels. In the following I will introduce different strategies proposed by various 
authors to combat propaganda on a national, EU but also NATO level.  
1. Combating ethnic tensions and separatist movements by building trust and 
enhancing dialogue between majorities and minorities in Lithuania 
One of the most promising strategies to combat propaganda is to address its underlying 
reasons. As described above, Russian propaganda is mainly aiming at the Russian-speaking 
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minorities in the Baltic States, feeding feelings of animosity against the majorities in the Baltic 
States and promoting separatist claims. “These instigations aim to polarize ethnic groups by 
encouraging them to choose only one identity dimension at the expense of the others, for 
persons with double or multiple ethnic identities […] (local, regional, and national, linguistic, 
cultural, religious etc.)”98. 
In order to remove the raison d’etre for such propaganda a direct engagement and intensified 
dialogue between the mainly Russian-speaking (but also Polish-speaking) minorities and the 
Lithuanian-speaking majority must be promoted. This requires encouraging exchange 
between minorities and majority at an institutional but also a communal level with a particular 
emphasis on an exchange of information, where both parties can express their views and 
learn about the others’ needs and demands personally instead of through distorted and 
politically charged media channels.99  
Such a dialogue could increase trust between the different parties and seems to be the most 
fruitful strategy to counteract propaganda in the long term. 
2. A Common European Communications Strategy 
A more strategic approach has been adopted on European Union Level. In March 2015 the 
EU decided to develop an action plan on strategic communication.100 Within the framework of 
this action the European Union Institute for Security Studies, upon request by the European 
Parliament has delivered a Report on ‘EU strategic communications with a view to counteract 
propaganda’101 (in the following: the report).  
This report suggests a ‘Common European Communication Strategy’ to combat Russian 
propaganda. Such ‘counter-communication’ seems necessary to raise awareness, assert 
facts, provide alternatives, and require accountability regarding Russian disinformation.  
According to the report first and foremost “any credible strategic communication effort […] 
must build on research and analyses dissecting the problem(s), the audience(s), and the 
message(s), and to be planned and implemented accordingly”102. Kuklys and Cârstocea note 
in this regard the importance of adapting the policies to local realities, meaning that 
significant differences exist between the different Baltic States, which need to be thoroughly 
examined, as the “Kremlin applies different approaches to different regions of the world, 
using local rivalries and resentments to divide and conquer”103. A policy meant to respond to 
such a challenge should thus be equally wide-ranging and adapted to local realities.104 
Furthermore they emphasise the advantage that can be gained through consulting and 
involving other countries in Russia’s neighbourhood (such as Moldova and Georgia) who 
have faced similar problems as the Baltic States regarding Russian influence in the process 
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of policy design. “Benefitting from the past experience of these countries would lead to a 
more refined, realistic and responsive approach to policy-making.”105 
Secondly the report elaborates on the infrastructures to implement such a communication 
strategy. They call for a fundamental change in the budgetary lines allocated by the EU to 
‘communications’. Instead of scattering the ‘communications’ budget across various projects 
and mini-campaigns making up a “patchwork of micro-initiatives”, the report calls for a more 
streamlined and pooled external communication, which would be easier to coordinate and 
could be carried out more efficiently. As part of this new infrastructure plan, the report also 
calls for training and recruiting staff “fit for purpose”. The authors of the report insist that 
strategic communication requires know-how which cannot be expected from administrative 
and technical staff, but rather requires the relevant cultural and linguistic skills of regional 
analysts and media operators.106 
The, in my opinion, most important proposal of the report relates to the methods and style of 
the envisaged strategic communication. “In terms of method and style the EU’s 
‘communications’ have often been faceless, anonymous, technocratic, unemotional, and 
reliant of the expectation (or rather assumption) that facts will speak for themselves.”107 This 
strategy however is prone to fail in the Post-Truth Age (see above). As Dorothy McCarthy 
ironically noted: “Lithuanians don’t necessarily watch Russian-language programming 
because they crave a daily dose of spin; they watch because the overall programming 
packages in which the news is embedded are well-made and entertaining. Thus, the mere 
presence of Russian-language news alternatives isn’t enough. Viewers cannot be given a 
choice between dessert and a bowl of vegetables.”108 Thus the Common European 
Communications Strategy stipulates that “rapid intervention teams shall quickly develop 
storylines about major policy issues or unfolding crises, preferably infused with real life 
situations and testimonies”109.  
As language is the key to communication, these programmes are supposed to be 
disseminated in as many languages as possible but especially in the local languages of the 
Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans and of course in Russian.110 As this will be 
very costly an alternative could be to simply produce subtitles in Russian and crucial regional 
languages for already existing European TV programmes. This approach would however 
ignore the importance of taking local realities (cultural differences regarding humour, daily life 
problems, relationships, etc. or regional jokes) into account (as suggested above).  
In this regard the report furthermore emphasises the importance of “discrete but steady 
support for independent local media in the region”.111 Professional training for local 
operators, such as capacity building for Lithuanian journalists through anti-propaganda 
journalism Tech Camps or Tours of the Baltic States for Russian-speaking journalists led by 
the US and NATO112 and other public diplomacy programmes could create a long term 
development of high quality journalism in the area.   
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3. Combating Propaganda at Grassroots Level – Online Public Information 
Campaigns  
The initiatives may however not stop at that. As the past years have shown the importance of 
traditional mass-media, such as television, radio and newspapers has declined, as the new 
media, e.g. online platforms, social media and blogs etc. have succeeded in conquering the 
media landscape. The spread of Russian propaganda is no longer limited to entertaining TV 
programmes but enters the Baltic States through strategic trolling of message boards, blogs 
and tweets.113 A set of policies designed to respond to the propagation of ethnic animosity, 
war and incitement to hatred in the online space is still lacking. However, when designing 
such policies, a fair balance between the freedom of expression and effective monitoring of 
online threats needs to be struck. In this regard, instead of censorship and public 
surveillance, the concept of ‘counter-speech’, which has been broad forward to counteract 
hate-speech on social media114, may be a useful method to respond to propaganda online. 
E. Conclusion 
In conclusion the European Commission in its decision of 17 February 2017 rightly decided 
that the decision adopted by the Radio and Television Commission of Lithuania of 16 
November 2016 was compatible with EU Law. 
Furthermore the Lithuanian authorities could have also adopted such a resolution under 
national law (e.g. Art. 19 and 34 LPI) as they have done before or under international law 
(e.g. Art. 20 ICCPR). As shown above it can also be argued that the Lithuanian authorities 
were in fact obliged under international law to prohibit such propaganda due to their 
protective duty arising under their international human rights obligations.  
However the decision to suspend rebroadcasting of a TV Channel alone is – taking into 
account the political implications – not sufficient, as it does not tackle the problem at its basis 
nor is it particularly effective. Channels might still be watched over the internet through 
proxies. The suspensions only target single programmes and not ‘information warfare’ as 
such and represent only a short time measure (3 month). It can even have a negative effect 
as it feeds the Russian narrative that Lithuania is trying to silence the truth and potentially 
undermine Lithuania’s credibility.  
Therefore it appears most promising to adopt strategies which combat propaganda at its 
roots. As suggested above combating ethnic tensions and separatism movements by 
building trust and enhancing institutional and communal dialogues between majorities and 
minorities in Lithuania, adopting a common European Communication Strategy and initiating 
public Information campaigns are possible strategies to counteract propaganda in the long 
run.  
In this regard we need to remind ourselves that we live in the ‘Post-Truth Age’ and facts 
alone will not prevail. Communication strategies operate on a factual and on an emotional 
level. This means on the one hand that TV and radio programmes, online campaigns, news 
shows etc. need to be entertaining and emotional, personal and appealing, but much more 
important, it means that people need to feel included in politics, need to establish a 
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relationship with their fellow citizens, need to be proud of their country and need to feel safe 
in their country. Only if a positive feeling towards the nation states, the EU and NATO can be 
created, propaganda will be defeated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Bibliography 
1. Bär, Jochen A., Gesellschaft für Deutsche Sprache e.V., Pressemitteilung vom 
09/12/2016, available at: http://gfds.de/wort-des-jahres-2016/ (last accessed on 
20/03/2017); it was also selected as the Oxford Dictionaries Word of the Year 2016, 
see https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/press/news/2016/12/11/WOTY-16 (last 
accessed on 19/04/2017)  
2. Council of European Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on "Hate Speech", (Adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 30 October 1997at the 607th meeting of the Ministers' 
Deputies), available at: https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearch 
Services/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId =0900001680505d5b (last accessed on 
21/03/2017) 
3. Ehlers, Dirk, Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, 4th ed., 2014 
4. EU-Ambassadors, quoted by ZEIT Online, Die EU zieht in den Propagandakampf, 20 
March 2015, available at: http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-03/russland-
propaganda-eu-strategie-informationskrieg (last accessed 30/03/2017) 
5. European Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, Brussels, 
6.5.2015, COM(2015) 192 final, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0192&from=EN (last accessed on 
28/03/2017) 
6. European Commission, Right environment for digital networks and services, available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/node/78516 (last accessed on 
28/03/2017) 
7. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Directorate-General for 
external politics, EU strategic communication with a view to counteract propaganda, 
2016, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/ 
578008/ EXPO_IDA(2016)578008_EN.pdf (last accessed on 19/02/2017) 
8. Free World Centre, The Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality, 
Article 19, Global Campaign for Free Expression, London April 2009, Principle 12 - 
Incitement to Hatred, available at: https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards 
/the-camden-principles-on-freedom-of-expression-and-equality.pdf (last accessed on 
31/03/2017) 
9. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 11: Prohibition of propaganda for 
war and inciting national, racial or religious hatred (Art. 20), 29/07/1983. CCPR 
General Comment No. 11 (General Comments), available at: http://www.ohchr.org 
/Documents/Issues/Opinion/CCPRGeneralComment No11.pdf (last accessed on 
31/03/2017) 
10. Ibrus, Indrek, The EU Digital Single Market as a mission impossible: Audio-visual 
policy conflicts for Estonia, International Journal of Digital Television, 2016, 7:1, p. 23, 
doi:10.1386/jdtv.7.1.23_1 
11. Jarass, Hans D. (ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der EU - Kommentar, 3. Aufl. 2016 
12. Kearney, Michael G., The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Law, 
Oxford 2007 
13. Kuczyńska-Zonik, Aleksandra, Antidiplomacy in Russia’s Policies regarding Russian-
Speakers in the Baltic States, Baltic Journal of Political Science, December 2016, no. 
5, p. 89 
14. Kukyls, Mindaugas/ Cârstocea, Raul, Instigations of Separatism in the Baltic States, 
June 2015, ECMI Issue Brief # 35 
24 
 
15. Maliukevičius, Nerijus, Tools of destabilization, Kremlin’s Media Offensive in 
Lithuania, Journal of Baltic Security, vol. 1, no. 1, 2015, p. 117 
16. Deborah A. McCarthy, (former) United States Ambassador to Lithuania, Defending 
the Tower in the Age of Twitter: Lithuanian Lessons on Russian Disinformation, The 
Ambassadors REVIEW, Spring 2015, p. 33 
17. Moore, Clay, Western Promises – Sustainability and Consequences for Baltic 
Security, Fall 2015, p. 17 
18. Nowak, Manfred, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – CCPR Commentary, 2. 
ed., 2005 
19. Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Non-Paper, 
Propaganda and Freedom of the Media, Vienna 2015, available at: 
http://www.osce.org/fom/203926?download=true (last accessed on 31/03/2017) 
20. Oxford English Dictionary, 2017, Oxford University Press, available at: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/152605?rskey=hyddW4&result=1&isAdvanced=false 
(last accessed on 03/04/3017) 
21. Pomerantsev Peter/ Weiss, Michael, The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin 
Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, Institute of Modern Russia (New York), 
2014, available at: http://www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/PW-
31.pdf (last accessed on 24/03/2017) 
22. Press Unit of the European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet on ‘Hate Speech‘, July 
2013, available at: http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/Portal/1292427369687 
?blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition&blob 
headername2=Grupo&blobheadervalue1=attachment%3B+filename%3D Hate_ 
speech__julio_de_2013.PDF&blobheadervalue2=Docs_Libertad+religiosa_interes 
(last accessed on: 31/03/0217) 
23. Richter, Andrei G., Legal Responses to Propaganda Broadcasts Related to Crisis in 
and Around Ukraine, International Journal of Communication, 2015, vol. 9, p. 3125 
24. Schadendorf, Sarah, Die UN-Menschenrechtsverträge im Grundrechtsgefüge der 
Europäischen Union, EuR 2015, p. 28 
25. Schmidt, Karoline, Analyse des EGMR-Urteils Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók 
Egyesülete und Index.hu Zrt gegen Ungarn (App. No. 22947/13) - Wie weit reicht die 
Meinungsfreiheit von Internet Service Providern?, Saar Brief, 02/2016, available at: 
http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/?p=1229 (last accessed on 29/03/2017) 
26. Schmidt, Karoline, Hassreden auf Facebook – Wie weit geht die Meinungsfreiheit?, 
Saar Blueprints, 04/2015 DE, available at: http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/?page_id=67 
(last accessed on 30/03/2017) 
27. Szczekalla, Peter, Die sogenannten grundrechtlichen Schutzpflichten im deutschen 
und europäischen Recht, 2002 
28. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Rabat Plan of Action 
on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence - Conclusions and recommendations 
emanating from the four regional expert workshops organised by OHCHR, in 2011, 
and adopted by experts in Rabat, Morocco on 5 October 2012, para. 19, available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/ Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf (last 
accessed on 31/03/2017) 
29. ZEIT Online, Die EU zieht in den Propagandakampf, 20.03.2015, available at: 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-03/russland-propaganda-eu-strategie-
informationskrieg (last accessed on 19/04/2017) 
 
